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Book Review
THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT, A STUDY OF
ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM. By Charles M. Cook.

Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1981. Pp.
234. $35.00
REVIEWED BY ANDREW

J. KING*

Although an important episode in our legal history, the codification movement of the 1820's and 1830's has received little more than a
sidelong glance from legal historians.' We live with restatements, uniform acts, and the Uniform Commercial Code, but we rarely acknowledge that the early nineteenth century codification debate influences
modem code writing. In The American CodificationMovement, Charles
M. Cook rectifies that mistake. In the first full-scale treatment of the
antebellum codification debate, Cook paints a detailed picture of the
confrontation between common lawyer and codifier. Drawing extensively from early American law journals and pamphlets, Cook has captured the flavor of that debate. He treats the codification movement as
something more than a whipping boy for common law devotees; yet he
does not draft a brief for the codifiers' side. Cook's basic position is
thatt the extremists on both sides of the issue were victims of their own
rhetoric and irrationality. Only the moderate codificationists - those
who would have cleaned up the morass of common law procedure and
restated clearly established common law doctrine in code form - appear as the reasonable advocates of law reform. Perhaps not coincidentally, these moderate codificationists resemble today's academic
codifiers.
Cook began his research believing it would reveal a post-Revolutionary debate about whether Americans would adopt the substantive
rules of the common law or the civil law. He soon learned, however,
that although there was a real debate, it essentially concerned how to
reform and to Americanize the legal system inherited from the colonial
* A.B. 1963, Antioch College; L.L.B. 1966, Harvard Law School; Ph.D. 1975, University of Wisconsin. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 351-53 (1973); P. MILLER, THE
LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 239-65 (1965);
R. POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 23-24, 151-54 (1938).
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period.2 He thus uses law reform to explain the codification movement.
For Cook, reformism designates the key actors and establishes the context of the debate.
Unfortunately, Cook's reformist thesis rests on the premise that
reform or change occurs in the legal system only because of "dissatisfaction" with the system's technical performance. 3 This technical perspective dominates Cook's analysis of law reform. Thus, "reformers"
act only when they perceive and define legal problems as technical
ones; lawmen - practitioners and judges - undertake reform only
when "actual" problems exist. By viewing codification through the lens
of technical law reform Cook establishes a double standard of interpretation. He treats the writings of lawmen as though they dealt with a
concrete problem in the legal system. On the other hand, he dismisses
the writings of non-lawmen as mere rhetoric, and, therefore, inconsequential. Thus Cook's explanation of the codification movement as a
"real" professional response to technical legal problems is akin to the
arid historical studies of legal doctrine produced earlier in this century.
Such "internal history" deflects attention from non-lawyers' antebellum critique of American law4 - a critique that raised serious political
and moral questions concerning the role of law in American society.
By forcing the profession to defend both itself and the common law,
such criticism stimulated the articulation of an ideological justification
for law in American society. Because Cook has unwittingly fallen into
the trap of explaining legal change from within the profession, we can
discern only occasionally the codification debate's broader political and
ideological meaning. Despite this shortcoming, Cook's work helps us
to understand the mechanics of antebellum law reform and the reasons
why codification failed to make more of an impact.
The American CodficationMovement covers the period 1776-1860,
which Cook divides into three sub-periods: 1776-1815, the pre-history
of codification; 1815-1830, the opening rounds of the debate; and 18301860, the culmination of the debate and the success of partial codification. He also examines codification in action in New York (a partial
success) and South Carolina (a failure). According to Cook, the legal
2.

C.

COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT, A STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM

LEGAL REFORM at ix-x (1981).

3. Id. at 202-03. Cook never explicitly defines law reform. The contexts in which he
uses the term, however, indicate that it means simplification and rationalization of legal
subjects that have become overly technical or complex. In this usage, law reform means
changing legal rules to produce a more efficient legal system. As my later criticism indicates,
this definition of law reform fails to account for its political dimension.
4. Gordon, Introductior .J WillardHurst and the Common Law Tradition in American
Legal Hirtoriography,10 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 9, 10-25 (1975).
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system inherited from the colonial period had three serious defects.
First, neither lawyers nor laymen knew the substantive law. The rules
were inaccessible - hence, unknown and uncertain. Second, the arcane nature of much English common law, especially legal procedure,
mystified the lay community. Third, the newly formed nation was reluctant to use English sources to unravel the common law's mysteries.
Of these three defects (which Cook calls abuses), the first was the most
important.5 The law's inaccessibility became apparent as the states
tried to deal with the legislation inherited from the colonial period as
well as the many statutes enacted by the new state legislatures. Only
later in the nineteenth century would Americans discover the same
problems in the common law.
During the immediate post-Revolutionary period most states enacted legislation that adopted British statutes in force as of a particular
date, and affirmed the common law's authority (the so-called reception
statutes). When new state legislatures began enacting large volumes of
legislation, lawyers faced a serious problem. There was no established
system for organizing and publishing statutes. Great numbers of obsolete, repealed, and out-of-date statutes compounded the problem.6
Many legislatures responded to this problem by undertaking statutory
revision. While Cook points out that these statutory compilations
(often only chronological by year of enactment) were not codifications,
he correctly identifies them as precedents for later, more comprehensive 'legislative efforts.
.Cook next discusses the common law and there comes face to face
with the crux of the codification issue. The American lawyers of the
post-Revolutionary period believed that the common law was a body
of fixed universal principles rooted in mankind's history and customs.7
Yet the convoluted texts of reported English cases and treatises hid
5. C. COOK, supra note 2, at 5. A technical interpretation would treat inaccessibility as
primary. The other two - lay concerns and nationalism - do not fit the simple stimulusresponse model that Cook employs. Cook asserts that the absence of the loyalist elite and
the inexperience of the remaining lawyers explains post-Revolutionary lawyers' dissatisfaction with the common law. Yet, the Maryland bar, for example, did not lose its most experienced practitioners. Nolan, The Effect of the Revolution on the Bar. The Maryland
Experience, 62 VA. L. REV. 969, 969-90 (1976). Cook also does not consider that lawyers'
attitudes toward statutory and common law flowed from the contrasting perception that
statutory law was created by legislatures and was applied prospectively, while common law
was discovered by courts and was applied retrospectively. See M. HORWITZ, THE TRANS-

1780-1860, at 4-9 (1977).
6. New Hampshire, for example, frequently enacted legislation with a fixed expiration
date, expecting to re-enact only those statutes that proved to be valuable.
7. One mark of Cook's presentism is that he does not seem to understand that lawyers
really believed in a common law of fixed principles. See C. CooK, supra note 2, at 112-13.
From a twentieth century perspective this antebellum idea is naive; but this failure to conFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
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these principles. The creation of an American federal republic exacerbated the lawyers' problem. As each state wrestled with the problem of
defining its own version of the common law, that supposedly unified
body of principles became fragmented. Furthermore, the separation of
powers doctrine and political events produced a distrust of judges that
added to the uncertainty about the authority of the common law. The
desire for judicial accountability promoted the publication of judges'
opinions, thus beginning the American tradition of fully reported cases.
Americans believed that published opinions would restrain judges from
rummaging through the mysterious common law.
During the second period, 1815-1830, an increasing number of reported cases and an eruption of new case law doctrine produced an
information overload for the legal profession. The focus of the complaints about uncertain and unpredictable law turned from statutes to
the common law. After 1820 codification became "a general American
law reform movement." 8 Yet, as Cook points out, the movement had
no spokesman and no umbrella organization. At various times different men emerged as its advocates, but lawyers predominated in both
the first and second periods of reform.
Although there was no archetypal codifier, Cook categorizes the
codifiers as moderates and radicals.9 The moderate codifiers proposed
to rationalize and to systematize the common law. They believed that
although its substance was sound, the common law needed to be reformulated so that it would be accessible to the profession. The modetates
sought to discard obsolete or overruled cases, and to condense the remaining case law into a set of concise principles. A state legislature
would then have combined these axioms with a reorganized body of
statutes, publishing the package as a comprehensive code. The moderates wanted to create a new American common law, thus inadvertently
gratifying the demands of American nationalism. Evidently the
moderates also clung to the ideal of a unitary common law of fixed
principles. Once those principles had been suitably reorganized, the
normal common law process of analogy would operate, enabling the
law to adapt to new circumstances.
This latter aspect of the moderates' theory separated them from
sider seriously the historical actors' perception of their world precludes a more sensitive
explanation for their actions.
8. Id. at 69. According to Cook, Jeremy Bentham coined the word, id.at 76; it was not
commonly used until the 1830's.
9. Id. at 79-88. In any analysis, classifying groups as "radical" places them at a disadvantage. Although Cook also indicates that the radicals were "conservative," that is, seeking
to stabilize the law via codification, this acknowledgement does not dispel the stigma.
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the radicals. The latter sought not only to redesign the common law,
but also to reform the rules along civil law lines and to prevent judges
from changing the newly fashioned rules. The radicals thus made a
frontal assault on the citadel of the common law method - reasoning
by analogy. Under the radical plan the legislature would replace the
courts as the key agency for legal change. Cases would no longer serve
as precedents; instead each decision would stand sui generis. The legislature would change the codes following a report from a judge that the
code did not cover a particular dispute.
Against these two loosely connected groups of reformers Cook
places the solid phalanx of common law orthodoxy. These theorists,
who supported common law methods and rules, rejected any legislative
intervention in the common law process.' I They clearly perceived the
historic interconnection between common law procedure and substance. I I In political outlook, however, little distinguished the orthodox from the moderates; both were "conservative."
In addition to analyzing the ideas of these three groups of lawyers,
Cook discusses the lay codificationists' position, although in less detail.
Before 1830 this group, according to Cook, was essentially a collection
of consumer advocates who used the codificationists' language to attack
egregious common law procedures. But in describing the 1830-1850
period, Cook must contend with interesting changes. First, the lay
12
codificationists launched an ideological attack on the common law.
Second, the anti-codificationists' criticism of codification and their defense of the common law became more strident. Third, the moderate
codificationists began to advocate codification of only those common
10. Modern analogues of the orthodox position may be found in R. BRIDWELL & R.
WHRITTEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON LAW 11-33 (1977); Priest, The Common
Law Processand the Selection f Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Rubin, Why is
the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977).
11. See T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 381-82 (1956).
Cook also fails to give adequate attention to the significance of the shift in American law
from procedural to substantive categories. This fundamental change enabled text writers to
create paradigmatic conceptions for each category of law. W. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION
OF THE COMMON LAW 87-88 (1975).
12. Cook's characterization of both periods as a lawyers' movement contrasts sharply
with Mark Tushnet's assertion that the first period was a lawyers' movement, and the second
was a popular one. Note, Swift v. Tyson Exhumed, 79 YALE L.J. 284, 297-308 (1969). In
fact, Cook does not seem to have been aware of Tushnet's treatment of codification. Cook
also fails to consider the impact of early nineteenth century labor union conspiracy cases on
the codification movement. Although Cook's bibliography lists the 1809 New York trial of
the journeymen cordwainers, he seems unaware that in that early case William Sampson,
one of the leading radicals, attacked the English common law as class law and called for the
creation of "a NATIONAL CODE." M. BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 75 (1976) (quoting I YATES'S SELECT CASES 142 (1811)).
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law rules that were generally accepted. Although the moderates had
once advocated codification as a means of clarifying confused portions
of the common law, between 1830 and 1850 they favored leaving those
subjects to further common law development.' 3 Cook describes these
changes but inadequately analyzes their significance.
At this stage Cook's technical law reform argument no longer suffices. Why were the anti-codificationists driven to defend the common
law process as a method of inherent perfectibility? Why did they and
the moderates adopt the premises of Savigny's historical jurisprudence
and the evolutionist growth metaphor? Why did the lay reformers
eventually abandon codification in favor of the popular election of
judges? Why all the brouhaha? These questions suggest that the codification debate was more than a squabble among reform and anti-reform elements within the legal profession. Certainly the debate was
more than a reaction to the efflorescence of American law in the first
thirty years of the nineteenth century - a debate that died away when
case law was "magically" organized by treatise writers and case digest
compilers.' 4 Fortunately, Cook's work suggests a more compelling explanation, one that requires the historian to consider seriously lay rhetoric as a product of an ideological debate raising serious questions
regarding the role of law in American society. When such debates surface - as they do periodically - they reveal a fundamental tension in
our culture between the values of legalism and justice. 5
Deep within the American mentality lies a profound distrust of
lawyers and the law. Caught in the dilemma of needing, yet despising
lawyers, Americans would, if given the choice, do without them. The
populace dreams of law without lawyers, of a regime of rules understood and obeyed by all. While lawyers deem such utopianism naive,
this lawyer-less ideal has always forced the profession to justify itself.
The ongoing need to legitimate its pre-eminent position in American
society helps explain both the anti-codificationists' and the moderates'
positions. Both groups moved to protect the common law from lay and
radical codificationists' criticism that the law was a weapon in the
hands of the judges. From William Sampson's defense of the New
York cordwainers' union in 1809 to Robert Rantoul and Frederick
13. The key historical figure in this shift is Joseph Story, who advocated in 1821 an effort
at broad common law revision, but in the late 1830's urged a more narrow partial codification of commercial and criminal laws. See C. CooK, supra note 2, at 48-49, 105-06, 175-79.
14. In stressing the digest writers' role, Cook revises Roscoe Pound's conclusion that
only treatise writers, such as Kent and Story, saved us from the evils of codification. Id. at
204-08.
15. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 291-305
(1969); P. MILLER, supra note 1, 99-109; J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 1-18 (1964).
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Robinson's attacks on the common law as anti-democratic in the
1830's, the legal profession was placed on the defensive.' 6 The profession responded by disengaging the common law process from politics.
The lawyers stressed the common law's neutrality and lack of arbitrariness. The orthodox argued that the common law was an inherently
perfectible system whose process produced rules validated by custom
and experience, an analogue to the self-regulating market of laissezfaire economics. For their part the moderate codificationists relied on
the ideology of science as a model. Codification would be the scientific
classification of the American experience and a more efficient means of
rule production than the inherited common law process. Both the orthodox and the moderates justified the legal system with ostensibly
apolitical and value-free methodologies. They believed that the rules
generated by the legal process would "apply uniformly to general
classes of persons or acts."'" We would continue to be a nation ruled
by laws, not by men. Thus the early codification movement helped to
produce the "rule of law" defense of the common law. The American
Codifcation Movement, however, only hints at this deeper meaning of
the nineteenth century codification episode.
16. See generally I YATES'S SELECT CASES 142 (1811) (Sampson); Rantoul, Oration at
Scituate, in THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE CIVIL WAR 22028 (P. Miller ed. 1962); Robinson, A Program For Labor in SOCIAL THEORIES OF JACKSO-

NIAN-DEMOCRACY 320-42 (J. Blau ed. 1954).
17. Trubek, Complexity and Contradiction in the Legal Order. Balbus and the Challenge
of Critical Social Thought About Law, 11 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 529, 541 (1977).

